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BY PROF. L. d:YY-BRUHL. 
Two periods are to be distinguished in Pascal's life: the first, in which he busied himself with mathematical and physical sci-
ences, and the second, in which, being thoroughly convinced of the 
vanity of these sciences, he confined himself to the science of 
morals. 
As a natural philosopher Pascal was one of the most pro-
nounced in his advocacy of the rights of experience and reason as 
against the me'thod of authority. The fragment of the TraiN du 
Vide expre'sses, in a wonderfully eloquent style, ideas which Bacon, 
Descartes and many others had previously advocated. Pascal's 
way of demonstrating them is decisive; by his very analysis of the 
notions of science and of antiquity he determines in what case and 
in what measure respect is due to the opinions of the ancients. 
Here Pascal even brings to light a point already touched upon 
by Bacon, but ignored by Descartes. In laying down the first rule 
of his method "to hold nothing as true unless one has evidence of 
its being so," Descartes based his reasons entirely upon the ab-
stract idea of science and upon the model of mathematics. For 
him these were sufficient motives to regard everything that pre-
ceded him as null and void, and absolutely to ignore tradition. 
He proposed to build up a philosophical system as if none had 
ever existed before him. Pascal, on the contrary, analyses the con-
fused idea of tradition, and seeks to derive thence the idea of pro-
gress. He represents mankind in its entirety as a single man liv-
ing forever and learning continually. Had not Descartes been so 
wholly taken up with his desire of utterly abolishing scholastic 
philosophy, he might also have noticed, were it but in geometry 
and astronomy, the onward march of scientific knowledge, which 
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is the most luminous illustration;of "progress" that .can be given. 
Pascal's idea is a remarkable one, inasmuch as it emphasises the 
continuity of progress. We shall find it reviving in the eighteenth 
century, under various forms, until the natural sciences, and partic-
ularly biology, substituted for the notion of uninterrupted p·ro-
gress the more complex conceptions of evolution and adaptation. 
In Pascal's views of scientific method, the influence of Des-
cartes is almost everywhere perceptible. Like Descartes, he has 
but little esteem for formal logic; real logic is to be found in 
mathematics. A metpod of avoiding error is sought by everyone. 
Logicians profess to know the way to it, but geometricians alone 
reach it, and outside their science and whatever imitates it, real 
demonstrations do not exist. Geometry therefore is the only real 
science, and this privilege it owes to the" order" which it follows. 
(Descartes himself had said, "The method consists wholly in the 
order to be observed," etc. Lastly, even as mathematics furnished 
Descartes with the idea of his philosophical method, so geometry 
suggested to Pascal that of a "still loftier' and flawless" one. But, 
unlike Descartes, who thought he had found the demonstration of 
the true philosophy, Pascal believes that a perfect method is be-
yond the reach of man. Geometry has to take for granted the defi-
nitions from which it proceeds and the axioms on which it rests, 
whereas a perfect procedure would define and demonstrate every-
thing. Geometricians, however, are quite justified in not demon-
strating that two quantities which are equal to a third are equal 
to each other, and in not giving a definition of space, time, and 
number, for such explanations as they might give of these notions 
would create obscurity rather than enlightenment. It is sufficient 
if their definitions and axioms be so perfectly clear and evident as 
absolutely to preclude denial. But still it is an imperfection in 
their science that these things have to be taken for granted. 
Thus geometry, although the least imperfect of human sci-
ences, can demonstrate nothing except by admitting undemonstra-
ble principles, and define nothing except by using undefinable 
terms. The question, whence these principles and notions are de-
rived, is a serious subject of discussion among philosophers. Some 
ascribe their origin to experience, others to the independent activ-
ity of the mind. According to Pascal, these principles spring from 
the "heart;" that is, we believe in them instinctively, and such a 
belief is as firm as any which reasoning can engender in us. "The 
heart" tells us that there are three dimensions in space, and that 
the ·succession of numbers is infinite. Principles we feel, proposi-
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tions we infer, and both with certainty, although by different 
means. And there would be as much absurdity in reason's asking 
the heart for proofs of its first principles before adhering to them 
as in the heart's asking reason to feel all the propositions it dem-
onstrates before accepting them. 
This is therefore no check upon geometry. It merely supposes 
us to know what is meant by the words motion, number, space. 
Without stopping for useless definitions, it penetrates into the very 
nature, and discovers the wonderful properties, of these three 
things, "which," says Pascal, speaking as a true Cartesian, "com-
prise the whole universe." But if we try to push. our reflexion 
higher, and to apply it to these principles themselves, we are 
stopped at the very first step and obliged to confess our ignorance. 
"Our soul is cast into our body, where it finds number, time, di-
mension; it calls these nature or necessity, and can believe nothing 
else." Seldom was Pascal more profound than in these few words. 
He touches here upon the idea of the relativity of knowledge. He 
intimates that the necessity of natural laws may possibly be only 
the necessity of the laws of our own thought, and that these funda-
mental laws, both of thought and of nature, may also, in some way 
unknown to us, proceed from the human organisation. Therefore, 
"what goes beyond geometry is beyond our reach." 
The critique of the faculties of the human understanding, 
which was not in Pascal's plan, is partly replaced in his Pensees by 
the consideration of the Infinite, the idea of which plays an impor 
tant part in his philosophy. According to him we know that the 
Infinite exists, but we are ignorant of its nature. We are ac-
quainted with the existence of infinite number and of infinite space, 
but cannot form conceptions of them. We know, at least, that the 
finite is incommensurable with the infinite. Therefore man, being 
finite, is unproportioned to the idea of the infinite; is lost and swal-
lowed up in it. In this infinite sphere, the centre of which is every-
where and the circumference nowhere-where do we stand? The 
question is of course unanswerable. "For what is man in nature? 
Nothing as compared with the infinite, everything as compared 
with nothingness-a mean between nullity and all. Utterly pow-
erless to embrace the extremes, therefore the end and the principle 
of things are forever wrapped in impenetrable mystery for him. 
He is incapable, in fine, of perceiving either the nothingness out 
of which he is drawn, or the infinite in which he is ingulfed." 
From this it follows that nature is as incomprehensible as God 
Himself, who created it. It is therefore useless to reduce the sci-
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ence of nature to that of geometry, as Descartes does (Pascal does 
not question here the rightfulness of the procedure); it is useless 
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to establish a geometrical" order," as the most perfect that man 
can attain to. It must still be admitted that between infinite space 
and the space which we conceive there is a boundless chasm, and 
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thatoor most intelligIble science is based on principles which we 
do not understand. And if, instead of refleCting upon the obj~ct of 
science, we refiect upon the mind by which science is made .. w,e 
are brought to the same confession; for we then percieve that 
our understanding, ·in the order of intelligible beings, holds the, 
same place as our body in the order of extended objects. 
The parallelism (a genuinely Cartesian one) involves conch.~-
From an Engraving by St. Aubin of the bust of Pajou. 
sions which Pascal draws at once. Even as our body is but an im-
perceptible speck in comparison with infinite space, so our under-
standing, in spite of all its exertions, is infinitely remote from the 
perfect comprehension of things. Whether contemplating them 
from above or from below, it is still equally far from the end. 
We are sequestered in a hidden province of the universe, from 
which it were sheer madness to think of escaping. Weare like-
wise confined to a certain degree of intelligence, higher than which 
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our faculties forbid us to rise. In the range of thought, as well 
as of space, we are a mean between nothing and everything, in-
finitely remote both from lifeless, unthinking matter and from that 
Absolute Thought which sees Being while creating it. Our knowl-
edge is bound to certain conditions. Man's pretension to absolute 
knowledge can spring only from an absurd-one might almost say, 
infinite-presumptuousness. 
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If, therefore, Pascal, in speaking of science, is now sympa-
thetic and admiring, now scornful and derisive, the diversity of his 
language is easily explained, and we need not suppose that Pascal, 
after admitting the validity of human reason in the earlier part of 
his life, despaired of it in the latter, and abandoned himself to 
scepticism. It is sufficient to observe that Pascal in some passages 
views science from the standpoint of the finite and in others from 
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that of the Infinite. In the first passages, when contemplating sci-
ence from a purely human point of view, he finds it to be logically 
lUlassailable (at least as regards geometry) and he extends this 
praise to "what imitates it," probably alludin g to philosophies of 
the stripe of Descartes's, which vies with mathematics in rigor. 
But when contemplating science and philosophy from the point of 
view of the infinite, their vanity, powerlessness and uselessness 
appear obvious to him, for there is no proportion between the hu-
man mind, which is finite, and the infinite object with which sci-
ence is concerned. Thus Pascal may say, without recourse to 
moral or religious argument: " Philosophy (that is the science of 
nature) is not worth an hour's pains ...... To write against those 
who pursue the sciences .... to scoff at philosophy-that is to be 
the true philosopher." 
For the same reasons, and without being self-contradictory, 
Pascal shows himself alternately favorable and hostile to Cartesian-
ism; yet this is no reason for inferring that he has changed his 
opmlOn. If there must be a science of physics, he evidently pre-
fers that of Descartes to that of Aristotle. What he thinks ridicu-
lous is the vain hope of attaining to a complete and definitive 
explanation of nature. Therefore, in speaking as a geometrician 
or natural philosopher of the Cartesian doctrine, he does not hesi-
tate to praise it; he even admires the cogito and the consequences 
inferred from it by Descartes. But when comparing such a phi-
losophy to the infiniteness of nature, which is the object of it, he 
finds it no less presumptuous and bold than the others. The closer 
he considers the infinite, the less interested he becomes in geome-
try and natural sciences; not that they seem to him less true than 
they did before, but that he sees the emptiness of them ,more 
clearly. Another science attracts him·-the science' of man, in 
which all his dearest concerns are at stake. 
* 
* * The science of man, or crf morals, as we know, was not to be 
found among philosophers. Pascal, however, was far from reject-
ing as worthless all that they had said on the subject. Two sects 
appeared to him particularly worthy of esteem, for each of them 
had partly descried the truth: the Stoics, represented by Epicte-
tus, and the Epicureans, represented by Montaigne. 
Epictetus knew the duties of man admirably well. He repeat-
edly stated that man's only study and desire should be to recognise 
and obey the will of God. He wished man to be persuaded that God 
governs all things with justice, to submit to Him willingly, and al-
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ways to have before his eyes the thought of death and of the most 
unbearable sufferings; thus triumphing over mean thoughts and im-
moderate desires. But after speaking of the duties of man in such 
language as would befit a Christian, Epictetus fails to acknowledge 
man's powerlessness. He is carried away by his pride. He falls 
into perdition by presuming too much on man's strength. He does 
not perceive that the nature of man is incapable of fulfilling its duty 
toward God alone and unaided. He magnifies mants liberty;' 
whereas man is really a slave to sin; he extols man's power, which 
he likens to that of the gods, whereas ever since the original fall 
man has been corrupt and miserable. And so this admirable sys-
tem of ethics leads to "diabolical pride." 
Montaigne falls into the opposite error. This philosopher has 
an incomparable faculty of making men realise their own weak-
ness. He insensibly overthrows all that is looked upon by men as 
absolutely certain, not in order to establish the contrary with the 
very certitude which he rejects, but merely to show that since ap-
pearances point with equal force to both conclusions, we cannot 
possibly know whereon to ground our belief. He shows the pliable-
ness of reason for all purposes and the vanity of its principles, even 
of those which are regarded as firmest and most natural, the errors 
into which man is inevitably allured by his imagination, the 
tyranny exercised upon him by custom and example, and his ridic-
ulous self-assumption. Thus reason, being "irretrievably foiled 
by its own weapons," is reduced to silence, and so abased that it 
can no longer decide whether it is superior or equal to the instinct 
of animals. 
But on the other hand, Montaigne acts like a heathen. While 
pointing out admirably man's natural helplessness, which Epicte-
tus ignored, Montaigne, with a cravenness doubly sham.ful in a 
Christian, neglects the duties of man, which Epictetus knew so 
well. He follows custom and instinct, and thus even as the 
Stoic is led astray by his pride, the Epicurean is led astray by his 
sloth. 
Would, now, the solution consist in accepting both Epictetus's 
and Montaigne's mode of reasoning, merely placing them in juxta-
position? Shall we obtain the true science of morals by conceiv-
ing the duties of man as Epictetus did, and his helplessness as 
Montaigne did? No; such a solution is unacceptable. Montaigne 
does not complete Epictetus; he directly contradicts him. Placing 
them together would result in nothing except strife and mutual de-
struction; for as the one has established certitude and the other 
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doubt, and the one has .championed the grandeur of man and the 
other his weakness, both their errors and their truths are mutually 
nullified. To reach an acceptable solution, we must discover a 
.. higher point of view, from which the contradictory elements will 
be reconcilable. 
In spite of the diversity of the problems in question the method 
here followed by Pascal offers a striking analogy with that em-
ployed afterward by Kant in overcoming the antinomies of pur-e 
reason. In the third antinomy especially, Kant shows that reason 
cannot decide between two conflicting propositions. It cannot give 
up the idea that there are free causes in the universe, as for in-
stance, man's will; but it also does not think it possible to give up 
the idea of the necessary concatenation of causes and effects. The 
interest of morals forbids that liberty should be sacrificed; the in-
terest of science demands determinism. How does Kant overcome 
the antinomy? By showing that the two statements are not abso-
lutely contradictory, but are only so in a certain sense, and that, 
from different points of view, they are both true. In time it is true 
that every phenomenon must needs be the result of antecedent 
phenomena. But out of time the law of causality is no longer neces-
sary, and nothing justifies us in asserting of "things· in-them-
selves" what we know to be true as regards phenomena. So that 
determinism remains true in the world of experience, while liberty 
also prevails in that of absolute reality. The antinomy is over-
come. 
In the same way the moral science of philosophers, according 
to Pascal, results in a seemingly insoluble antinomy. Man c~nnot 
at the same time be incurably helpless, as Montaigne says, and 
have duties imposed upon him such as are pointed out by Epicte-
tus; yet both of them were right. What, then, shall raise us to the 
higher point of view from which this contradiction disappears? 
Reason by itself is unable to do so. Its most strenuous exertions 
may carry it as far as Epictetus or Montaigne, but not beyond 
them. This the Gospel alone can do. I t reconciles these contra-
rieties by a purely divine art; and by uniting all that is true, and 
by rejecting all that is false, makes of the result a truly celes-
tial body of wisdom, wherein the conflicts which by human doc-
trine were irreconcilable are found to agree. And the reason of 
this success is that the philosophers of the world have always put 
contrary -!kings togetlier in one and the same subject, the one attribut-
ing man's ·grandeur to nature, and the other his weakness to the 
same source-a formal contradiction; whereas faith has always 
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taught us to place them in different subjects, attributing to nature 
what is infirm and what is powerful to the grace of God .. Man in 
the helpless state conceived by Montaigne is man falleri and cor-
:rupted by sin. Man able to fulfil the duties conceived by Epic-
tetus is another man, regenerated and redeemed by Christ, sup-
ported by God's grace. Here also the antinomy is overcome. 
There remains, however, an essential difference between the 
case of Kant and that of Pascal. Never for a moment does Kant 
abandon the ground of philosophy, and the elements of his solu-
tion are supplied to him by his own Critique of Pure Reason. But 
according to Pascal the antinomy of the science of morals would 
have remained forever insoluble had not God condescended to en-
lighten us. Pascal abandons the domain of reason. and appeals to 
faith. In order to justify such a momentous step he had to show 
its undeniable necessity; in other words, he had to demonstrate 
that the antinomy could not possibly be solved in any other man-
ner. The science of man must appear as evident and easy to grasp 
from Pascal's Christian point of view, as it is absurd and unintelli-
gible from any other point of view. 
In this sense, Pascal's Entretien avec M. de Sad sur Epictete et 
Montaigne may be looked upon as a sketch, afterward to become 
a completed picture in the Pensies. We see. him, in this latter 
work, expatiating on the grandeur and misery of man with such a 
passion that the 'strokes never seem to him strong enough or the 
contrast sufficiently conveyed to the reader. "What a chimera 
man is, what a strange monster, what a chaos, what a subject for 
contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, and a miser-
able worm; a depository of truth, and a sink of uncertainty and 
error; at once the glory and the scum of the universe! .... If he 
extols himself, I humble him; if he abases himself, I exalt him, 
and always I contradict him, until he comprehends that he is an 
incomprehensible monster." Then, but only then, could Pascal 
propose, or rather impose, the only solution ~hich, according to 
him, was: to :throw a light into thi,s darkness: "Hearken unto 
God." 
Pascal's methOd. was that of persuasive demonstration; which 
he adopted after mature 1lleditation; and froin which he never 
swerved. The criticism of the dog matte and Pyrrhonian doctrines, 
the picture of man's incomprehensiWe condition, of his grandeur 
and misery, the examination of social ethics, the exposition of the 
proofs of Christianity, all tended to one object-namely, to show-
ing that reason itself leads to belief and finalJy submits to. reV'ela-
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tion. But the Penster have been handed down to us in a fragmen-
tary and unfinished form; and though one can restore the leading 
ideas and even the main lines of the plan followed and desired by 
the author, one is also at liberty to regard the book as a simple 
collection of reflexions and maxims without reference to their hid-
den links and connexions, and so to emphasise only certain parts of 
them to the relative neglect of the others. This has been done, for 
instance, by those who being chiefly impressed by what Pascal says 
of the weakness of human reason have mistaken him for a sceptic. 
Thus, also, the Pensees have often been read for their own sake, 
without much regard for the end which Pascal wished them to 
serve. And thus it has happened also that their influence, which 
has been great, has not fulfilled the intentions of their author, and 
through such not infrequent irony of fate this great apologist of the 
Christian religion has supplied its enemies with a whole arsenal of 
weapons. 
His very theory of reason, which was impotent beyond certain 
limits, was in itself somewhat dangerous to the cause he wished to 
uphold. It was quite a different thing from Montaigne's scepti-
cism. The latter was a means employed by Montaigne to combat 
fanaticism and the evils engendered by it; but it was only a 
means, and did not prevent Montaigne from preserving a certain 
number of moral convictions to which he was wedded; the argu-
ments on which that scepticism was grounded had nothing original 
about them. Pascal's more penetrating genius raised the question 
of the legitimate use of human reason itself, and sought to assign 
its limits. On the one hand, he acknowledges the value of positive 
science (provided it admits the derived nature of its principles) 
and in this he is unlike the traditional and improbable sceptic in-
vented by philosophers. But, on the other hand, he affirms that 
"what goes beyond geometry is beyond our reach," and we also 
know that science derives its principles from a superior domain, 
access into which is denied us. We are aware of the existence of 
the infinite, but ignorant of its nature, of which we must remain 
forever ignorant, since there is no proportion between us and the 
infinite. Pascal here opened the door to agnosticism, of which our 
century has beheld numerous and various forms. Now agnosticism 
-may be and often is found associated with religious tendencies; 
but it may also be antagonistic to religion. At any rate, it is 
nowise connected especially with the Christian belief or the Roman 
Catholic dogma. History shows that the abandonment of rational 
-metaphysics has not been beneficial to revealed religion. 
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Thus, as regards the relations between reason and faith, with 
which Pascal was so infatuated, the result of his exertions ran dia-
metrically counter to his purpose. When he says that Christian 
dogma, in the eyes of the world, is a vain folly, that the original 
sin condemning thou$ands of guiltless beings to eternal damnation 
is revolting to our sense of justice, the philosophers of the eight-
eenth century are loue! in their praise. Many also approve of Pas-
cal's regarding the philosophical proofs of the existence of God as 
inadequate to convince hardened atheists. They easily grant that 
reason is one thing, that faith is another thing, and that there is no 
natural transition between the two. But when he thence infers that 
one must be a Christian, he is no longer followed. His premises 
are retained and his cqnclusions dropped, to the great benefit of 
unbelief and of natural religion, both of which he almost equally 
detested. 
It was next in the order of Pascal's method of demonstration 
to prove, as Montaigne had done, that man's reason is powerless 
to regulate his conduct, and that custom and prejudice alone sup-
port morals. He proceeded to this proof with such earnestness 
and energy that even his friends were terrified, and did not dare to 
publish this part of the Pensees without extenuating, in almost 
every sentence, the boldness of his thought and the harshness of 
his words. Yet there remained in it reflexions on justice, on law, 
on property, on social distinctions and privileges, and even on sov-
ereignty, the daring of which was not surpassed in the eighteenth 
century. Pascal concluded that all these social institutions are 
mere conventions, unjustifiable to reason. Not being able to make 
strong what was just, men have made just what was strong. These 
conventions, though not respectable in themselves, become so in 
the eyes of a Christian; so that the frame of the social order indi-
rectly serves to prove the truth of Christianity, since on this truth 
the validity of the social frame depends. But the philosophers of 
the eighteenth century neither were nor wished to be Christians; 
they merely gathered from Pascal's arguments that social institu-
tions were a heap of rubbish, nonsense, and injustice. 
Lastly, Pascal, admitting no other direct proofs of supernatu-
ral religion than supernatural facts, grounds his faith on prophe-
cies and miracles. "Were it not for miracles," he says, "I should 
not be a Christian." A momentous saying, because it was liable to 
be interpreted quite otherwise than Pascal intended. Pascal does 
not mean that if miracles appear incredible to a man he is thereby 
exempted from being a Christian. Pascal means, on the contrary 
---------------
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that whoever has faith finds in miracles wherewith to explain his 
faith, to himself at least. He understands that prophecies and 
miracles prove the truth of Christianity, and if the demonstration 
has no effect on certain minds, it is because God has willed them 
to remain blind. It is not the demonstration which is insufficient; 
it is they who are not in a fit state to receive it. 
Still Pascal was here again opening a dangerous path. Hith-
erto the discussion of the outward proofs of Christianity had sel-
dom extended itself beyond the world of theologians. Pascal was 
among the first to transfer it to the public domain of philosophers 
and men of letters. He was as poorly armed for such a discussion 
as can be imagined, though it is true that very few men in his 
time were better equipped. The divine nature of the sacred texts 
had prevented even the thought of a critical examination of them. 
But the adversaries of Christianity, although rather inexperienced 
in this style of criticism, soon felt that they might turn to good ac-
count the example set by Pascal. The part played in their contro-
versy by the discussion of prophecies and miracles is sufficiently 
well known. Voltaire was inexhaustible on the subject of sacred 
history. And we may wonder whether the scientific exegesis which 
came later, disinterested and impartial as it was, did not deal an 
even heavier blow than these gibes and taunts to the beliefs which 
Pascal would fain have strengthened! 
